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Every week in the past I wrote about potential Ukrainian counterattack options as we look ahead to the mud to dry. I wrote about apparent targets in Starolisk in Ukraine’s northeast, and slicing Putin’s valuable “land bridge” connecting the Russian mainland with the Crimean peninsula within the south, with potential advances towards Melitopol or Mariupol.
However I concluded with a pipe-dream thought: profiting from doubtlessly skinny Russian defenses round Donetsk metropolis smack in the midst of the Donbas, on the coronary heart of territory occupied by Russia since 2014.
Together with a strike on the equally thinly defended Starobilsk strategy, this fantasy assault would appear like this, engulfing the majority of Russian forces in a single sweeping pincer maneuver.
Whereas I nonetheless don’t anticipate something of this kind, the notion acquired added assist from @Tatarigami_UA, a Ukrainian officer who not too long ago served round Vuhledar. In a thread analyzing Wagner Group founder Yevgeny Prigozhin’s newest proclamations (which I wrote about in yesterday’s update), he dropped the next hypothesis:
Whereas it is unclear if our command will determine to counter-attack within the [Bakhmut] space, it is fairly attainable that what russia was in a position to obtain in the midst of 9 months shall be reversed inside per week and lead to a breakthrough and encirclement of Horlivka and the rears of Donetsk.
Whereas that is mere hypothesis on my half, contemplating the poor state of their troops in Bakhmut, launching a counter-offensive on this course might trigger a critical blow to russian morale. This is only one of many potential instructions for such an assault.
Whoa, whoa, whoa.
Somebody requested him the identical query many requested me after I wrote about focusing the counterattack round Donetsk metropolis: “Fascinating observations. Nevertheless, I do have a query: Why do you imagine Ukraine can counter assault in Horlivka? Is not the pre-2022 Donbas border supposedly closely fortified? If they will go previous mentioned fortifications, why not go for Donetsk metropolis as a substitute?”
His reply: “Not Horlivka itself, however slicing off necessary provide routes that result in Donetsk by Horlivka space, therefore most of their troops round Donetsk. It is at all times higher to drive your enemy to retreat or give up than to carry out massive assaults on cities like Donetsk”
Let me present you what he’s speaking about. It’s not fairly what I had proposed, however shut, and higher:
Tatarigami_UA argues that “Wagner troops lack each coaching and expertise in making ready complicated and arranged defenses. Organizing defenses, establishing firing positions, and managing logistics in a well-structured method is tough, and Wagner shouldn’t be designed or geared up for it.” The belief is {that a} well-coordinated counterattack straight at Wagner would collapse that entrance, permitting Ukraine to hurry its troops right into a breach straight into Russia’s undefended rear.
All indications are that the majority of Russia’s forces are defending the land bridge, which might permit Ukraine to romp all that solution to Amvrosiivka, slicing off Donetsk metropolis’s essential logistical lifeline: the T0507 freeway and the one rail line from Russia feeding the town of 1 million.
Russia would then be in a bind. With out realizing simply now a lot of Ukraine’s reserves have been dedicated, it might be loath to maneuver forces from the land bridge space or up north, lest they open up a second avenue for Ukraine. And fairly frankly, the mobilized mobiks sitting in defensive trenches could be fairly ineffective trying to dislodge any competent, well-equipped Ukrainian advance. If these might assault, they’d’ve performed it this winter as a substitute of sitting nonetheless as Wagner did many of the transferring and dying. The few Russian military models that engaged—VDV airborne troops round Kreminna within the northeast and naval infantry (Marines) round Vuhledar—acquired their asses kicked. They’re now not efficient preventing forces.
The advantages of liberating Donetsk metropolis could be incalculable. As I beforehand wrote, “Along with the incalculable propaganda worth of liberating a metropolis of 1 million below Russian management since 2014, it might successfully cut up the Russian military into northern and southern halves. It could deprive Russia of a key supply of cannon fodder. A key logistics distribution heart, it might minimize the one rail line from Russia to Mariupol and the remainder of the occupied land bridge (at the least till the Kerch Bridge rail line is operational once more, which nonetheless isn’t the case).”
And keep in mind, there are not any defensive strains again there. If Ukraine is romping within the backfield, it might transfer in any course it desires (as long as it might set up and defend its provide strains). That pincer maneuver towards the north would nonetheless be in playing cards. And should you’re questioning, “couldn’t Ukraine be outflanked by Russian forces attacking from Russia,” simply keep in mind that NATO estimates that over 97% of Russia’s forces are already inside Ukraine. There’s nothing else to ship.
To be very clear, this officer is simply speculating. He doesn’t have inside information. If Russian intelligence is monitoring his account and taking it critically, perhaps it means they pull defenders from different energetic fronts, making Ukraine’s job simpler assuming they strike in one of many extra apparent instructions. However I don’t imagine his hypothesis is meant in that vogue.
In context, he’s saying Wagner is operating out of steam, and so they solely know one factor: the way to push ahead. If pressured to go on the defensive, he argues they’d fold, opening up a spot for a possible Ukrainian spearhead to use.
There’s already a ton of arguing over what “success” seems like for Ukraine’s upcoming counteroffensive. what could be inarguable? Liberating the capital metropolis of Donetsk.
Final evening, Russia aimed a brand new spherical of missiles and rockets at Ukraine.
What was anticipated to be an enormous barrage appeared to fizzle. As I write this, Ukraine reported 18 Kh-101/555 cruise missiles have been launched, and 15 of them have been shot down. By all indications a large number of them have been directed towards Kyiv. Given the extraordinarily excessive intercept charge, there’s a great likelihood that Ukraine’s shiny new Patriot batteries acquired their battle christening.
At one level, OSINT sources monitoring radio chatter counted 20 TU-95/TU-160s strategic bombers within the air. I don’t know if it was subterfuge (Russia has launched “phantom” missiles earlier than to try to idiot and overwhelm Ukrainian air defenses) or if the OSINT trackers tousled, however Ukraine claims that simply 11 plane launched missiles. On condition that solely 18 cruise missiles have been launched, that implies that every plane, on common, carried fewer than two missiles. For context, every plane might carry eight cruise missiles.
Sadly, earlier Sunday, Russia did rating a direct hit on a army goal in Pavlohrad, hitting the rail station in a bid to hamper Ukrainian logistics forward of its counteroffensive, and apparently hitting a munitions dump. (Russia claims air protection missiles.)
Different sources steered Russia focused, weirdly sufficient, jet gas as soon as used to gas Soviet intercontinental ballistic missiles, now saved at a chemical plant. (Here’s a 2013 article about this system.)
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